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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
The present matter is one part of the complex antitrust litigation involving the 
pharmaceutical product Lipitor and a settlement agreement between Pfizer Inc. and 
Ranbaxy Inc. This Court has already issued two precedential opinions in this case. Lipitor 
III was jurisdictional in focus and we concluded that the Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims did 
not “arise under” patent law.1 Consequently, we denied the Defendants’ motions for 
transfer to the Federal Circuit.2 In the subsequent merits opinion, Lipitor IV, we reversed 
the District Court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ consolidated complaints.3  
The present Plaintiffs—a group of California pharmacists collectively referred to 
as RP Healthcare—constitute a distinct party within the broader Lipitor litigation, and 
their complaint presents unique legal questions, both substantive and jurisdictional. In 
contrast to the other Plaintiffs, RP Healthcare bases its claim exclusively on California’s 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 In re: Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 145 (3d Cir. 2017). We continue the 
same numbering scheme used in our previous opinions. Lipitor I and Lipitor II are 
opinions of the District Court. 
2 Id. 
3 In re: Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act.4 Therefore, whether we may exercise jurisdiction 
turns on the diversity of the parties.5 In Lipitor III, we held that the record lacked 
sufficient evidence to determine the citizenship of each Defendant, so we directed the 
District Court to conduct limited discovery on that issue.6 Of course, with the 
jurisdictional question undecided, we could not reach the merits of RP Healthcare’s 
complaint in Lipitor IV. On remand, the District Court found that there was complete 
diversity amongst the parties and upheld jurisdiction on that basis. We will affirm. 
Turning to the merits, we will also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of RP 
Healthcare’s complaint, but for different reasons. Finally, we will affirm the District 
Court’s ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the Defendants, Daiichi 
Sankyo Company, Ltd. 
I. 
Diversity Jurisdiction 
RP Healthcare filed its initial complaint in California state court. Following 
removal—and transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation—the District 
Court declined to remand the case back to state court, grounding its finding of federal 
jurisdiction in potential patent defenses of the Defendants. Because federal “arising 
under” jurisdiction must be based on a plaintiff’s complaint, not possible defenses, we 
                                              
4 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq. 
5 The parties agree that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
6 Lipitor III 855 F.3d at 134. 
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observed in Lipitor III that this ruling was in error.7 That did not end our analysis, 
however, because after the District Court declined to send the case back to state court, but 
prior to final judgment, RP Healthcare voluntarily dismissed what appeared to be each of 
the remaining non-diverse Defendants, with the “appeared to be” resulting from the 
aforementioned uncertainty over the citizenship of several Defendants. Our Order in 
Lipitor III asked the District Court to resolve this uncertainty.8 
Back in the District Court, the parties stipulated that at the time of final judgment 
all of the Plaintiffs were citizens of California and none of the Defendants were citizens 
of California. Complete diversity being established, the District Court held that it had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We agree. As discussed in Lipitor III, a District 
Court may exercise jurisdiction if, at the time of final judgment, there is a proper basis.9 
This is the case even if, at an earlier point in the proceedings, there was no basis for 
federal jurisdiction.10 RP Healthcare’s original remand motion should have been granted 
for lack of jurisdiction, but, by the time of final judgment, there was complete diversity 
between the parties. Therefore, the District Court’s jurisdiction was ultimately proper, 
notwithstanding the prior erroneous decision. 
II. 
RP Healthcare’s Complaint 
                                              
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 150 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 64 (1996)). 
10 Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 64. 
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Having established jurisdiction over RP Healthcare’s complaint, we may now turn 
to its merits. Put very briefly, a reverse settlement occurs (almost exclusively in the 
pharmaceutical sector) when a patent holder sues an alleged infringer and the suit is 
settled with a large payment from the patent holder to the infringer. Such a settlement is 
usually accompanied by a promise from the infringer to exit the market for a certain 
length of time. A distinguishing feature of a reverse settlement is that the bargained-for 
abstention period falls within the term of the patent at issue, when the patent holder 
would normally enjoy a government-conferred monopoly. Absent the patina of patent 
protection, the agreement would be nakedly anti-competitive. In this case, Pfizer sued 
Ranbaxy for infringement of a Lipitor patent and the parties entered into an agreement 
bearing many of the now-familiar hallmarks of a reverse settlement. RP Healthcare’s 
complaint alleges that this agreement constituted a per se antitrust violation under the 
Cartwright Act. 
The District Court previously dismissed the RP Healthcare complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) for the same reason it dismissed those of the other Plaintiffs: its failure to 
calculate the reasonable value of the alleged “reverse payment” between Pfizer and 
Ranbaxy. As to those other Plaintiffs, we reversed this dismissal in Lipitor IV, concluding 
that in reverse settlement cases “[t]he Supreme Court did not require the advanced 
valuations . . . required by the District Court.”11 Throughout this litigation, however, RP 
                                              
11 Lipitor IV, 868 F.3d at 255. 
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Healthcare has been at pains to stress that it is alleging a per se antitrust violation, not a 
reverse settlement claim under FTC v. Actavis,12 so the same reasoning ought not to 
apply. We agree, and this distinction is fatal to its claim. Under California antitrust law, a 
reverse settlement may not be attacked on a per se basis, so the District Court’s dismissal 
was proper. 
As we observed in Lipitor IV, “[p]rior to [the Supreme Court’s decision in] 
Actavis, several courts had held that [reverse settlement] agreements were immune from 
antitrust scrutiny so long as the asserted anticompetitive effects fell within the scope of 
the patent.”13 In Actavis, the Court rejected this categorical rule and held that, in general, 
“patent and antitrust policies are both relevant”14 in determining the proper level of 
antitrust immunity conferred by a patent, and, in particular, reverse settlements implicate 
antitrust concerns when their payments are “large and unjustified.”15 
The California Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Actavis to the Cartwright 
Act in In re Cipro Cases I & II.16 Of particular importance to the RP Healthcare 
complaint, the California Supreme Court first determined what degree of antitrust 
scrutiny should apply to a reverse settlement. Under California law, “certain categories of 
agreements or practices that can be said to always lack redeeming value . . . [are] per se 
                                              
12 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
13 868 F.3d at 250 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
14 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
15 Id. at 2237. 
16 61 Cal. 4th 116, 142-43 (2015). 
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illegal.”17 However, reverse settlements do not fall within the per se category and must 
instead be scrutinized under a structured rule of reason analysis.18 Because the agreement 
between Pfizer and Ranbaxy was a reverse settlement, RP Healthcare’s claim of a per se 
violation of the Cartwright Act necessarily fails under Cipro. 
Perhaps cognizant of this unremarkable application of California law, RP 
Healthcare attempts to escape Cipro’s reach by arguing that the agreement between 
Pfizer and Ranbaxy was not a reverse settlement at all. Whereas reverse settlements 
regulate activity within the term of a disputed patent, it argues, the agreement in this case 
only covered the time period following the expiration of the Lipitor patent. RP Healthcare 
dates this expiration to June 28, 2011, but this is simply inaccurate. To be sure, a Lipitor 
patent expired on that date, but RP Healthcare conspicuously ignores the fact that Lipitor 
was covered by at least five other patents that expired between 2013 and 2017, well 
outside the period contemplated by the settlement agreement. Whether Ranbaxy could 
have designed around these later-expiring patents—thus producing a generic version of 
Lipitor without infringing upon them—is relevant under a rule of reason analysis.19 But 
questions about the practical durability of a patent have no bearing on its presumed 
validity. The settlement agreement’s basic attributes, which cannot be ignored, reveal that 
                                              
17 Id. at 146. 
18 Id. at 148. 
19 The ease with which a generic manufacturer could design around such patents 
would serve as a relevant indicator of the overall strength of Pfizer’s position in 
negotiating the settlement. The weaker a patent holder’s position, the more likely a 
reverse settlement will be found anti-competitive. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236-37.  
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it was a straightforward reverse settlement under Cipro. This forecloses any claim of a 
per se antitrust violation.  
III. 
Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Daiichi Sankyo Company, Ltd. 
 One final matter remains from our Order in Lipitor III. When the District Court 
originally dismissed the present complaint, it did so under Rule 12(b)(6). One Defendant, 
however, Daiichi Sankyo Company, Ltd., had asserted an alternative basis for dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(2) for want of personal jurisdiction. The District Court never addressed 
Daiichi Limited’s personal jurisdiction motion, which should have logically preceded any 
decision under Rule 12(b)(6).20 Following our limited remand in Lipitor III, the District 
Court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction and modified its dismissal order to reflect 
Rule 12(b)(2) as the proper basis. We will affirm. 
 As the District Court found, Daiichi Limited (1) is a Japanese corporation; (2) is 
not incorporated or registered to do business in California; (3) has no offices or other 
company facilities in California; (4) has no employees in California; and (5) has no 
appointed agent for service of process in California. RP Healthcare claims that personal 
jurisdiction exists because Daiichi Limited allegedly conditioned its purchase of stock 
from Ranbaxy, an Indian company, upon Ranbaxy entering into the present agreement 
with Pfizer. Following a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2), the burden is on the 
                                              
20 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 
(2007). 
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plaintiff to prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.21 We agree 
with the District Court that RP Healthcare has failed to allege, let alone prove, any facts 
that would support a California court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. Even if the 
allegations regarding the sale of stock are true, such an agreement would not show that 
Daiichi Limited “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within” California, as would be required to support personal jurisdiction.22  
IV. 
 The Order of the District Court will be AFFIRMED. 
 
                                              
21 IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
22 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).  
